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THE CHILD WITH Two FATHERS:
UPDATING THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON
King Solomon has long been revered as a man of great wisdom
because of his resolution of a dispute between two women over the
rights to one child.' Although Solomon's handling of the dispute may
lend itself to differing interpretations, 2 the problem and the outcome
are clear: two mothers claiming the same child, only one of whom may
be awarded all rights to the child. The notion that only one woman is
entitled to the child persists today, underlying the exclusive status given
to parents: "The law recognizes only one set of parents for a child at
any one time, and these parents are autonomous, possessing compre-
hensive privileges and duties that they share with no one else." 3 The
rights and duties of the parents are ordinarily indivisible as well, in that
each parent will have every right accorded to parents. 4
In Louisiana, the exclusive status of parents has been modified as
courts have confronted the issue of dual paternity-a child with two
fathers-a modern variation of the Solomon story. Typically, these
disputes arise when the natural father and mother conceive a child out
of wedlock. The mother is either married to someone other than the
father at the time of conception, or she marries someone other than
the father after conception but before the child is born. In either
situation, the husband of the mother is presumed by law to be the
father since the child was either conceived or born during the husband's
marriage to the mother.'
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. The ancient story, recounted in the Old Testament, tells of two women prostitutes
who lived in the same house and had each recently given birth. Upon the death of one
of the infants, both women claimed the living child. In the absence of any proof, King
Solomon decided the issue by ordering that the child be cut into pieces and awarding
each woman one of the halves. When one of the women offered to withdraw her claim
in order to save the child's life, Solomon proclaimed her the mother and presented the
child to her. I Kings 3:16-28.
2. This story has been offered both as an example of an application of the "best
interests of the child" test in deciding custody disputes, and as an example of focusing
on who the child's real mother is without considering the child's best interests. See,
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Executive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 Va. L. Rev. 879, 891 n.68
(1984).
3. Id. at 879.
4. Id. at 883.
5. "The husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of all children born
or conceived during the marriage." La. Civ. Code art. 184.
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Some cases are initiated by the child, who is attempting to establish
filiation (a biological relationship) to his natural father for the purpose
of securing some property right, such as a right of inheritance. Other
actions to establish filiation, brought by the natural father for the
purpose of securing parental rights, particularly visitation rights, have
forced recent developments in the law regarding dual paternity. Unlike
the child's actions, the rights sought by natural fathers are more often
personal in nature, as opposed to proprietary.
There is much debate in Louisiana concerning the concept of dual
paternity-both its statutory basis, if any, as well as its practical and
legal implications. The focus of this comment will be narrowed6 to the
issues which arise when a natural father attempts to acquire visitation
rights with respect to a child who has a legal father under the provisions
of Civil Code article 184. The comment will conclude with two proposals
for updating Louisiana law. The first is that two fathers, one legal and
the other biological, may share rights to one child. Although the husband
of the child's mother should remain the legal father unless he timely
disavows his paternity,7 the natural father, in an effort to gain visitation
rights, should be allowed to make out a factual basis of paternity.
Second, the methods employed by the courts in granting visitation rights,
which to date have been unpredictable, should be replaced with uniform
guidelines.
I. LOUISIANA STATUTORY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL BASES FOR THE
ASSERTION OF AN UNWED NATURAL FATHER'S8 RIGHTS
The Civil Code sets out a tightly organized framework governing
the parent-child relationship. Initially, children are classified as either
legitimate or illegitimate, 9 in that "[legitimate children are those who
are either born or conceived during marriage or who have been legiti-
mated." 10 The child's birth or conception during marriage creates a
presumption that the husband of the mother is the child's father," unless
6. Each parental right and obligation, including custody, visitation, inheritance rights,
and wrongful death actions, raises different issues in the context of dual paternity.
7. See La. Civ. Code arts. 187-190.
8. The terms "unwed" and "natural" are used throughout this comment to clarify
that the father whose rights are being addressed is both (1) not married to the mother
of the child (at least at the time of the conception and/or birth of the child), although
he may be married to someone else, and (2) the biological father, related to the child
by blood. The term "putative father" has been avoided because its definition is limited
to alleged or reputed fathers of illegitimate children. Black's Law Dictionary 1113 (5th
ed. 1979).
9. La. Civ. Code art. 178.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 179.
II. La. Civ. Code art. 184.
[Vol. 461212
1986] COMMENTS 1213
he disavows such paternity within one hundred and eighty days after
he "learned or should have learned of the birth of the child.' ' 2 Herein
lies the dilemma: while a father may legitimate or acknowledge his
illegitimate child, 3 and thereby establish his biological relationship,' 4
there is no express method for a father to filiate with his natural child
when the child is classified as the legitimate child of another man. 5
Nor does the Code give a right to anyone except the husband, and
sometimes his heirs, to rebut the presumption of the husband's pa-
ternity. 6 It is little wonder that the presumption of the husband's
paternity has been labelled "the strongest presumption in the law."' 7
The first circuit relied heavily on this presumption in Burrell v.
Burrell. 8 In that case, the court flatly rejected a mother's request for
support from the natural father of her children because the children
were born while she was married to someone else. The court said:
For reasons which should appear obvious, a child can have
but one legitimate father. The presumption of legitimacy resulting
from birth during the existence of a lawful marriage is absolute
and irrefutable (excepting only the right of disavowal under
proper circumstances) and precludes application of any rule,
principle or theory which would admit of proof that such a
child is the offspring of anyone other than the lawful husband
of the mother which bore such child. 9
On the other hand, since Warren v. Richard,2 a legitimate child
seeking filiation to his natural father has found the pathway quite easy.
In Warren, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a child could recover
for the wrongful death of her natural father even though she was the
12. La. Civ. Code arts. 187, 189.
13. La. Civ. Code arts. 200, 203.
14. That legitimization and acknowledgment of an illegitimate child serves both to
filiate and classify the child is expressed in the part of article 208 which says that "a
child . . . who has not been filiated by the initiative of the parent by legitimation or by
acknowledgment under Article 203 must institute a proceeding under Article 209." La.
Civ. Code art. 208 (emphasis added).
15. It may be argued that the word "illegitimate" in the legitimation and acknowl-
edgment statutes can be interpreted as "illegitimate in regard to the claiming father,"
even though the child is technically "legitimate" by the circumstances of his birth or
conception. In fact, the court in Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 479 So. 2d 324 (La.
1985), used a similar argument. See note 35 infra and accompanying text. However, this
seems to confuse the "classification" of a child with his actual biological paternity.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 190.
17. Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren
v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 La. L. Rev. 59, 59 (1976).
18. 154 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
19. Id. at 107.
20. 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
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legitimate child of another man. One year later, in Succession of Mitchell,2'
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the marriage of four children's
natural parents after their birth served to legitimate them and thus give
them inheritance rights, notwithstanding that the children were born
during their mother's marriage to another man, their presumed father.
The significance of Mitchell is that: "[I]t changes the rules by which
paternity is fixed. The presumption apparently still operates to fix pa-
ternity upon a 'legal' father, but now there is an alternative avenue by
which paternity may be fixed upon a second man, the 'biological'
father.' '22
Until 1981, the trend seemed clear: "to allow the true parentage of
an individual to be established, if such can be accomplished. 2 3 Act
72024 of that year, however, which amended Articles 208 and 209 of
the Civil Code, emerged as a possible roadblock to the recognition of
dual paternity. These articles, which provide the mechanism through
which a child filiates to his natural parent, previously stated that, "any
child may establish filiation, regardless of the circumstances of concep-
tion." '25 Act 720 amended the articles to state that "a child who does
not enjoy legitimate filiation, ' 2 6 and "a child not entitled to legitimate
filiation, 2 7 may filiate. In addition, Act 720 amended another statute 28
to allow the Department of Health and Human Resources to take direct
civil action to establish filiation against an alleged natural parent even
when the child has a presumed father. It has been argued that when
the changes are considered together, "the discernible legislative intent
is that a child presumed to be that of the husband of the mother may
not institute a proceeding to establish filiation to another man."2"
In Griffin v. Succession of Branch,10 the first circuit followed this
interpretation. Griffin held that children who wished to establish filiation
to a natural father inorder to be recognized as his heirs could not do
so, since they were the legitimate children of another man and had not
rebutted the presumption of legitimacy.' The court observed that the
amendments to articles 208 and 209 prevented a "legitimate child from
21. 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975).
22. Spaht & Shaw, supra note 18, at 78-79.
23. Thomas v. Smith, 463 So. 2d 971, 975 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
24. 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, § i.
25. La. Civ. Code art. 209 (as it appeared prior to 1981 La. Acts No. 720, § I).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 208.
27. La. Civ. Code art. 209.
28. La. R.S. 46:236.1(F) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
29. Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Persons, 42 La. L. Rev. 403, 407
(1982).
30. 452 So. 2d 344 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984), rev'd, 479 So. 2d 324 (La. 1985).
31. Griffin v. Succession of Branch is the subject of an upcoming comment in this
review and is not discussed in detail here.
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shopping for a more prosperous biological father, ' 3 2 and that permitting
legitimate children "to bastardize themselves for a larger share of the
succession pie would contradict public policy and the 'good order'
envisioned in the Civil Code." 33
The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently reversed this holding.
The court took the view that children already enjoying legitimate filiation,
"are not precluded from instituting a filiation action under that article;
they are merely relieved of the obligation to do so by operation of
law." 34 Further, the court held that -it was the legal relationship between
a child and his natural father which was significant. Since the children
in Griffin were "technically illegitimate" 5 as to their natural father,
they were "commanded by that article [209] to institute the [filiation]
proceeding."13 6 While conceding that a-preclusion of rights to establish
dual paternity might protect the family unit, the court asserted that,
"it is equally as sound to conclude that the threat of possible future
filiation proceedings may also strengthen the marital relationship."" 7
In Finnerty v. Boyett,3 8 a case decided before the final decision in
Griffin, the trend toward establishing true parentage was continued in
the context of an action by a natural father. The second circuit held
that the alleged natural father of a child born during the marriage of
the mother to another man had a right of action to establish his paternity
for the purpose of seeking visitation rights. The court determined that
an interpretation of "Art. 184's presumption as irrebuttable would de-
prive such [natural] fathers of the opportunity to develop a relationship
with their children, and thus would deprive them of the limited due
process rights afforded them by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Proc-
ess Clause."3 9
In response to the mother's contention that the paternity action
would bastardize a child who had previously enjoyed legitimate filiation,
the court stated:
[An avowal action is not an attempt by the natural father
to exercise the presumed father's right to disavow paternity. The
two actions are distinct and separate. The disavowal action
breaks the tie upon which legitimate filiation is based, and thus
serves to bastardize a child; the avowal action establishes the
32. 452 So. 2d at 347.
33. Id.
34. 479 So. 2d at 327 (emphasis by the court).
35. Id. at 328.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 469 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 292.
t Of"
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existence of a tie not previously recognized, and thus serves to
establish true filiationA°
The court continued with a perplexing discussion of filiation and legit-
imation actions. Implicit in this discussion was an acknowledgment by
the court that the Code does not resolve the child's status after a
Finnerty-type paternity action. The court concluded that, "[iln light of
this state's strong and deeply-rooted policy of avoiding the bastardization
of innocent children . . . we hold that allowing the father in the instant
case to establish his child's true filiation does not bastardize the child,
who remains the legitimate child of her present father." '4'
As a result of Finnerty and Griffin, the trend of dual paternity has
gathered new strength in Louisiana. 42 However, the current methods
employed by the courts in establishing dual paternity, particularly when
a suit is brought by a natural father, present a confusing and possibly
erroneous mixing of classification processes (establishing legitimacy or
illegitimacy) and filiation actions (establishing biological relationships).
In Finnerty, the court allowed the natural father to establish his paternity
by means of an "avowal action, '43 but the nature of this action was
not explained, although the court did make comparisons between the
''avowal action" and a father's actions of acknowledgment and legiti-
mation of his illegitimate child. In Griffin, the Louisiana Supreme Court
labelled the children "technically illegitimate"" as to their natural father,
and implied that the natural father could have legitimated the children
under Article 198 or formally acknowledged them under Article 203. 41
In two earlier cases,4 Louisiana courts properly awarded visitation
rights to one unwed father and the right to seek visitation to another.
Nevertheless, in those cases, too, the methodology was suspect. In Taylor
v. Taylor,47 the third circuit addressed an action by a natural father to
be recognized as the father of two children. At the time of the suit,
the plaintiff and the mother of the children were married but had
40. Id. at 293.
41. Id.
42. This trend is limited to the context of civil actions. The Louisiana Supreme Court
recently addressed the effect of the Article 184 presumption of paternity in a criminal
neglect of family suit. The court concluded that the presumption could not be used in
the criminal prosecution since such use would unconstitutionally "relieve the state of its
burden of proving every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State
v. Jones, 481 So. 2d 598 (La. 1986).
43. 469 So. 2d at 293.
44. 479 So. 2d at 328.
45. Id.
46. In re Murray, 445 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984) and Taylor v. Taylor,
295 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 299 So. 2d 799 (La. 1974).
47. 295 So. 2d 494.
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separated. The children had been conceived by them during the mother's
previous marriage to another man.
The court held that since there had been no disavowal action by
the first husband, the natural father had no right of action to demand
recognition as the father of the children. Despite this denial, the court
reached a just result by finding that the natural father did have a right
of action to seek visitation rights, based upon the facts of the case and
the best interests of the children. The court concluded:
Plaintiff still remains a legal stranger to these children because
legislation, policy, and precedent demand that justice turn a
blind eye to his pleading to be recognized as the legal father.
These factors do not, however, require that we become deaf
and speechless as well. Legal fictions and presumptions need
not extend beyond their necessary and useful sphere.48
In re Murray,49 a fifth circuit case, involved a situation in which
the alleged natural father, a disabled veteran suffering from amnesia
and partial paralysis, filed suit to regain custody of his child from his
sister and her husband, who had refused to return the child to the
plaintiff after a visit. The natural mother had died, and her husband,
the presumed father, did not want custody of the child. The court denied
custody to the alleged father in light of the presumption that someone
else was the father and awarded custody to the sister, based on a
determination of the child's best interests.
The court did grant the natural father visitation rights. It concluded
that he had a legal relationship to the child as a result of his "judicial
admission" of paternity. 0 In granting visitation, the court cited Taylor,
and concluded that such a finding would be in the best interests of the
child." Thus, the court took both approaches: the father was vested
with a legal relationship with the child, but the awarding of visitation
rights was based on a determination of the child's best interests. The
court did not define the extent of the legal relationship, except to say
that it did not give rise to the right to custody."2
Overall, Louisiana courts have reacted fairly to the natural father's
assertion of rights, but have had to devise creative strategies to obtain
just results. The common thread evidenced in the various opinions has
been the courts' concern for protecting the child's best interests. In
Taylor, the court found no statutory authority for the natural father's
rights and looked instead to the facts of the case and the child's best
48. Id. at 496.
49. 445 So. 2d 21.
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id. at 25.
52. Id. at 24.
1986] 1217
1LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
interests. The court in Finnerty apparently used a statutory basis for
recognizing the father's, rights, but the particular statute used to establish
filiation is not clear. Once paternity was established, the actual deter-
mination of whether the father would be granted visitation rights turned
on a determination of the child's best interests. 3 In the case of In re
Murray, the court used both approaches-the best interests of the child
and the father's admission of paternity-as the bases for the assertion
of parental rights. Again, what the court meant by "judicial admission"
is not apparent. Finally, in the latest comment on dual paternity in
Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Griffin implied that a natural
father can legitimate or formally acknowledge his children even if they
are already classified as legitimate, since the children are "technically
illegitimate" as to the natural father.
The current need to rely on the court's good will and creativity for
the just resolution of such disputes should be replaced with clear statutory
authority for allowing the natural father to make out a factual basis
of paternity from which he may derive visitation rights. In addition,
courts should be given a framework of guidelines for determining whether
the father should, in fact, be accorded visitation rights once he has
successfully established his parental status. Careful analysis of the many
issues which arise in these disputes is necessary when creating such a
statutory scheme. Significant among these issues is the father's right to
due process.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNWED NATURAL
FATHER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
A. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court has not yet confronted a case involving
the particular factual situation under analysis, the Court's opinions
regarding the rights of unwed fathers in matters involving their illegit-
imate children should provide a framework for the analysis of such
rights when the child is considered legitimate under state law.
In Stanley v. Illinois, 4 an unwed father attacked as unconstitutional
a statutory scheme which declared that children of unmarried fathers
were to be declared wards of the state upon the death of the mother
without a hearing on the father's fitness. The Court held that the denial
of a hearing violated the father's right to due process." In recognizing
53. 469 So. 2d at 296-97.
54. 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1209 (1972).
55. The Court's holding that the scheme also violated Stanley's right to equal pro-
tection of the law will not be discussed, as the due process analysis is sufficient for the
purposes of this article.
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this right, the Court observed that a hearing is not required in all cases
of government impairment of private rights. Instead, the procedures
required depend upon the nature of both the governmental function and
the private right. The Court characterized the father's private interest
as "that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, [which]
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection." '5 6 The state's interest in caring for the children
would be of little weight if the father was found to be a fit parent.
The facts of Stanley differ from the situation under analysis, in
that the plaintiff in Stanley faced removal of the children from his
custody, while the natural father of a child with another "presumed"
father has usually never had custody. In addition, the plaintiff faced
no countervailing private interests, while the natural but unwed father
of a legitimate child must assert his rights in opposition to the formidable
interest in the integrity of a family unit, which has been accorded much
deference by the Court.17
Nevertheless, Stanley does offer a framework for analyzing the rights
of natural fathers. The Court extended constitutional protection to the
unwed father in regard to his relationship with his illegitimate children
by imposing procedural safeguards, and indicated that the use of a
presumption in determining parental rights will be subject to close scru-
tiny. The presumption embodied in the statutory scheme in Stanley was
that unwed fathers are unfit to raise their children. The Court condemned
this approach:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when
it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past for-
malities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important
interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.5"
The Court did not clearly indicate which unwed fathers are- to be
protected,59 nor the extent of due process protection accorded to other
actions affecting the unwed father's parental interests.
In succeeding cases, the Court refined some of the issues unanswered
in Stanley. Quilloin v. Walcott6° presented a situation in which the
56. 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S. Ct. at 1212.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 656-57, 92 S. Ct. at 1215.
59. At one point, the Court stated the protected interest to be "that of a man in
the children he has sired and raised," 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S. Ct. at 1212, but later
broadened this language in a footnote to extend the opportunity for a hearing "to unwed
fathers who desire and claim competence to care for their children." 405 U.S. at 657
n.9, 92 S. Ct. at 1215-16 n.9.
60. 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978).
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unwed father's rights required review in the face of substantial coun-
tervailing interests. There, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Georgia's adoption laws which required only the mother's consent for
adoption when the child was illegitimate. The Court held that in this
particular case the father's due process rights were not violated by a
trial court determination based on the best interests of the child. Over
a period of eleven years, the father had neither sought custody of his
child nor taken steps to support or legitimate the child. Significantly,
the adoption resulted in full recognition of an existing family unit, "a
result desired by all concerned, except [the father]. ' '6'
In Caban v. Mohammed,62 the Court addressed the substantive rights
of an unwed father who faces the obstacle of an existing family unit,
but has himself participated in the rearing of the child. Here, a natural
father of an illegitimate child challenged a New York statute which
allowed an unwed mother but not an unwed father to block the adoption
of an illegitimate child. The stepfather of the child wished to adopt his
wife's children, and the statute did not allow the father to contest the
adoption. The Court found the statute unconstitutional on equal pro-
tection grounds, and thereby avoided the issue of the father's substantive
rights. Nevertheless, Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion is instructive:
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships
more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child, and in
this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the
father's parental claims must be gauged by other measures. By
tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate familial
relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother
.... In some circumstances the actual relationship between
father and child may suffice to create in the unwed father
parental interests comparable to those of the married father. 63
This distinction between a "biological" relationship and an "actual"
relationship was the central issue in Lehr v. Robertson,' the Court's
most recent treatment of the rights of unwed natural fathers. In Lehr,
the father of a child born out of wedlock contested the validity of an
adoption order in favor of the child's stepfather, rendered without giving
the father advance notice of the adoption proceedings. The father had
not entered his name in New York's putative father registry, which,
under the statutory scheme, would have entitled him to notice. He had
filed a paternity petition one month after the adoption proceeding com-
61. Id. at 255, 98 S. Ct. at 555.
62. 441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
63. Id. at 397, 99 S. Ct. at 1770-71 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
64. 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
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menced. The trial judge knew of the pending paternity action, but signed
the adoption order anyway.
The Supreme Court held that the father's rights had not been
violated, since he had never had a significant personal relationship with
the child, and since the law had provided the father with a mechanism
for the protection of his relationship with the child, of which he simply
failed to take advantage.
Although the technical aspects of the holding may be questioned, 6
the Court properly emphasized the importance of the presence or absence
of an "actual" relationship with the child:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers
the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses
to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the
child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution
will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion
of where the child's best interests lie. 66
The principles extracted from these Supreme Court cases provide a
basis from which the substantive and procedural rights of an unwed
natural father of a legitimate child may be analyzed. In terms of sub-
stantive rights, the natural father has little protection without the ex-
istence of an "actual" relationship with the child, especially since his
rights must be weighed against the rights of the family unit-the mother,
the presumed father, and the child. The obstacle may be greater if the
family is intact, and the father's assertion of rights can be viewed as
a disruption of the family's stability. On the other hand, in a situation
where the natural father has established an "actual" relationship with
the child, the existence of an exclusive family unit becomes questionable.
In such a setting, the denial of the father's rights could be equally
disruptive to the family unit, in that the child may have become psy-
chologically attached to the father.67
Though not accorded the same significance as an "actual" rela-
tionship in determining the extent of parental rights, the biological
relationship between the natural father and child is important as a basis
for establishing parental status, from which an actual relationship may
65. Justice White's dissent argued that a paternity petition should be afforded the
same recognition as an entry in a putative father registry, which is itself a notice of the
father's intent to file a paternity action. Id. at 274-75, 103 S. Ct. at 3000-01 (White, J.
dissenting).
66. Id. at 262, 103 S. Ct. at 2993-94.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 106-120.
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develop and parental rights may be asserted. Lehr indicates that while
a father's rights are based on his actual relationship with the child, a
state may be required to afford him some opportunity to establish that
relationship.6 8 The Court would also view unfavorably the use of a
presumption rather than a hearing on the merits to determine whether
a father merits the opportunity.6 9
B. State Supreme Court Decisions
Three state supreme courts have confronted the problem of a natural
father seeking a determination of his parental rights in the face of a
presumption that the mother's husband is the father of the child.
In R. McG. v. J. W.,70 the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
statutory scheme establishing a presumption of paternity in the mother's
husband which could be rebutted by the mother, but not by the alleged
natural father, denied equal protection. The court allowed the natural
father standing to establish his paternity.
The concurring opinion analyzed the alleged father's rights based
on due process grounds, weighing his interests against the state's interest
in protecting the family unit. In R. McG., the child was conceived and
born during the marriage of the mother and the husband, and the
marriage was intact at the time of suit. Blood tests failed to exclude
the plaintiff as the natural father, and in a sworn codicil to her will,
the mother acknowledged that the plaintiff was the child's father. Never-
theless, it was the fact that the plaintiff visited the child almost daily
and developed a close relationship with him, that swayed the concurring
opinion. The concurrence concluded that the alleged father had the due
process right to assert his paternity, observing that if he had "not made
continuing efforts to maintain contact with the child and indicated his
desire to support the child, the state's interest would prevail."',
The California Supreme Court addressed the problem in Michelle
W. v. Ronald W.72 when an alleged natural father and his daughter
brought an action to establish his paternity. The trial court held that
the plaintiffs could not rebut a statutory presumption of paternity in
favor of the mother's husband, and the California Supreme Court
affirmed.
The child in this case was conceived and born during the marriage
of Judith and Ronald. After the child was born, the couple remained
68. 463 U.S. at 262-65, 1.03 S. Ct. at 293-95.
69. Cf. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57, 92 S. Ct. at 1215.
70. 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980).
71. Id. at 673 (Dubofsky, J., concurring).




married for several years before obtaining a divorce. Judith then married
the alleged father. She was given custody of the child, and Ronald was
granted visitation rights. The alleged father together with the child then
brought a paternity action.
To determine the due process rights to be accorded the child and
the alleged father, the court weighed their interests against the interests
of the state. The court concluded that the interest of the child and the
alleged father was merely an "abstract interest in establishing patern-
ity," 73 since they were already living together in a family unit. Therefore,
the interests of the state in preserving familial stability prevailed.7 4 The
dissent pointed out that this interest was hardly abstract on the alleged
father's part, since any right he had to a relationship with the child
would exist only as long as his marriage to her mother continued. In
addition, the dissent argued that the familial stability which was the
focus of the state's interests had already been disrupted by the divorce.
Since the alleged father was actually living with his child, his ability
to have a personal relationship with his child was not an immediate
issue, and the court was not forced to analyze the problem very closely.
Thus, the majority opinion in Michelle W. provides little guidance for
analyzing the father's due process rights.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts confronted the
problem in P.B.C. v. D.H.75 In that case, a child was conceived four
months after the mother filed for divorce, but while she was still legally
married. The child was born the day after the divorce was finalized.
The alleged father was allowed access to the child for more than a year
after the child's birth. He then filed this suit, requesting that he be
declared the father and be granted custody or visitation rights. Soon
after suit was filed, the mother and her previous husband were remarried.
Unlike in the other cases, no statutory presumption was at issue.
Instead, the court extended existing case law, holding "that a child con-
ceived by a married woman is presumed to be the child of the man to
whom the mother was then married even if the mother and the husband
are divorced at the time of the child's birth." '7 6 The court further
concluded that the plaintiff had neither a constitutional nor a common
law right to a judicial determination of whether he was the natural
father, in light of the state's strong interests in protecting children and
encouraging stable family life. 77
73. Id. at 752, 703 P.2d at 92.
74. The court also found that the denial of this action did not violate equal protection.
See id. at 754, 703 P.2d at 94, 95.
75. 483 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1985).
76. Id. at 1096 (emphasis by the court).
77. Id. at 1097.
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In summary, the concurring opinion in R. McG. points to a dis-
tinction, reminiscent of Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban and the ma-
jority opinion in Lehr, between the biological relationship and the actual
relationship of the father and child as the crucial factor in determining
the father's substantive rights. Such a distinction reflects a growing trend
toward viewing the natural father's rights with more concern. 78 The
natural father's interest in fostering an existing strong actual relationship
with his child may prevail over a presumption of paternity in favor of
the husband of the child's mother, even though both the conception
and birth occurred during the mother's marriage to the husband, and
even though that marriage remains intact. The dissent in Michelle W.
brings out the compelling realization that without legal standing of his
own, the natural father's ability to have a relationship with his child
depends on the mother's wishes alone. And finally, P.B.C. bucks the
trend toward increased substantive rights for the natural father, at least
when there are strong countervailing interests in preserving an intact
family unit. The court in P.C.B. completely discounted the natural
father's rights in such a situation:
[O]rdinarily an unwed father has a legally protectable interest
in his children, and ... is entitled to establish that he is their
natural father. But it does not follow, and Stanley v. Illinois...
does not require, that, in all circumstances, a man claiming to
be the father of a child conceived while the child's mother is mar-
ried to another man is constitutionally entitled to be heard on
the question of paternity."
Yet it is possible, and often more practical, to resolve such clashes
of interests without entirely excluding the interests of the natural father
or of any one party to the dispute. While an accordance of rights to
the natural father should not pre-empt valid concerns of the other parties,
neither must these other concerns be upheld at the expense of the father's
rights.
III. THE PROBLEM OF COMPETING INTERESTS
In Finnerty v. Boyett,s° a child was conceived by the mother and
the plaintiff. Subsequent to the conception but prior to the child's birth,
the mother married another man, who was aware of her pregnancy and
78. See the discussion of the United States Supreme Court cases supra accompanying
notes 54-69.
79. 483 N.E.2d at 1097.
80. 469 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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of the child's true paternity."' The child was born during this marriage,
and therefore the husband was presumed to be the father.
Three years later, the natural father brought an action, seeking both
recognition of his paternity and visitation privileges. He alleged that he
had openly acknowledged the child from the time of her conception,
had sent child support, and had been allowed visitation privileges until
just prior to the suit. The mother denied that she had allowed the
natural father visitation privileges and denied receiving any support for
the child from him. The husband testified that, although people in the
community knew he was not the child's natural father, he treated her
as if she were his own child.
Finnerty's facts provide a useful scenario through which the com-
peting interests in these disputes may be identified. A fair determination
of the natural father's rights requires careful examination of these in-
terests.
The natural father's interest presents a very real concern: without
an affirmation of his paternity, he has no clear basis for acquiring
visitation rights, and thus no possibility of maintaining a personal re-
lationship with his child. While the extent of his actual relationship with
the child may be disputed, whatever relationship he has been able to
establish may be terminated at will by the mother and husband unless
his rights are recognized. It may be argued that the natural father could
have married the mother in the first place, and secured parental rights
to the child. However, if marriage provides the only source of rights
for a natural father, his rights again hinge entirely on the mother's
wishes. She can effectively exclude the father by refusing to marry him.
Although the father's establishment of a personal relationship with
the child may be impeded, he does have a parental obligation of support.
The Department of Health and Human Resources is authorized to take
direct civil action against the natural father to establish his paternity
and to compel payment of child support, even when the child has a
presumed, legal father.12 Thus, in answer to the argument that the father
should have used better judgment and avoided the pregnancy altogether,
this same argument could be made with regard to the mother; only the
results differ. The mother is vested with all the rights and the obligations
of parenthood, while the father receives only the obligations.
Finally, it may be noted that the natural father in Finnerty brought
the action three years after the child's birth. While three years is a
substantial length of time, especially in the child's eyes, the father
allegedly had been allowed to visit the child until that time, and brought
81. Though not discussed in the majority opinion, the dissent notes that the mother
had first sought marriage with the natural father, but was rebuffed. Id. at 297.
82. La. R.S. 46:236.1(F) (1982).
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suit only after the mother discontinued the visits. Assuming the truth
of the allegation, the inference may be drawn that he truly desired a
relationship with the child and abstained from bringing the suit so as
to avoid harassing the'family.
The mother's interest is to maintain the integrity of her family unit.
She has accepted responsibility for the child since birth, apparently
without seeking direct child support from the father. She wishes to avoid
the potential disruption to her family which might result if the natural
father establishes visitation rights. Besides the physical disruption caused
by his presence during visits, the father's presence may also pose a
threat to the mother's relationship with her husband, the father serving
as a constant reminder of their former relationship. In addition, the
relationship between the mother and child may suffer from the tension
created by the visits. Finally, the mother may be concerned that the
establishment of the natural father's paternity would effectively bastard-
ize the child, notwithstanding the legitimate circumstances of his birth.
These concerns may lose significance if it is shown that the father
has established an actual relationship with the child by visiting the child
regularly and contributing to the child's support. If so, it may be harder
to view the father's assertion of rights as an intrusion, since the family
may have already adjusted itself to include the father. The response to
the mother's fear that her child will be bastardized is that the community
is already aware of the child's true paternity through those actions of
the father which created the actual relationship.
Most significant to the mother, regardless of the nature of the
existing relationship between the father and child, is that the natural
father's success in the action will wrest control of the relationship away
from her and place it with the court. Even though she may have allowed
visitation in the past, she was in a position to control the degree of
intrusion. If visitation rights are granted to the father, her family's
integrity is, to some extent, at the mercy of the court.
Another interest worthy of consideration is that of the husband in
his status. If a successful paternity action by the father serves to entirely
rebut the presumption of Article 184, it would be as if the husband
had disavowed paternity, leaving him with no parental status whatsoever.
If, instead, the father's paternity rebuts only the presumption that the
husband is the biological father, dual paternity will result. The husband
will be the legal father, and the natural father will be the biological
father, but the rights and obligations attaching to each are not clear.
The husband's other interests are similar to the mother's, with one
exception: whereas the mother has a legally imposed responsibility for
her child, the husband voluntarily assumed his role as father, with all
of its obligations as well as all of its rights. To pre-empt his assumed
role as father would be unjust.
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The state's interest parallels that of the mother and the husband.
That protection and promotion of the family unit is a legitimate state
interest"3 has been frequently acknowledged by the United States Supreme
Court. "
The child's interests 5 include a right to a family life free from
disruption, as well as a personal right to continue in a relationship with
her natural father. If the child has no existing relationship with her
father, allowing the father visitation rights may intrude on her rights
to privacy and cause emotional confusion. If an actual parent-child
relationship does exist between the two, a successful paternity action
and assertion of visitation rights by the natural father may be the only
available option for a continuation of that relationship.
When property rights, as opposed to personal rights, are at stake,
a mother is more likely to assert her child's biological relationship to
a natural father in order to provide for the child's welfare. As discussed
earlier, the Department of Health and Human Resources will similarly
take action to identify the father and enforce the child's right to financial
support as a protection against public dependency.
6
In contrast, the child's personal interests in a relationship with her
natural father will not likely be championed by a mother who has denied
the father access to his child. A paternity action serves as a basis for
asserting the personal right to a parent-child relationship, making it as
vital to the child as it is to the father. Indeed, it could be argued that
the father should be allowed to bring the suit on behalf of the child
as well as on his own behalf.
Finally, the child has an interest in the determination of her true
parentage. Though not a compelling interest in the Finnerty scenario,
where the biological parentage is not disputed, an accurate knowledge
of biological heritage is increasingly vital to a child for its significance
in medical treatment.
In Finnerty, the competing interests were resolved in the natural
father's favor. The court held that the natural father had a right of
action to establish his paternity, concluding that denying him of the
right to rebut the presumption of Article 184 would deprive him of his
right to due process. The court noted that an existing actual relationship
between the natural father and child is more significant than the bio-
logical connection, but that "[nievertheless, the biological relationship
does entitle a natural father to at least some opportunity to develop a
83. 469 So. 2d at 289.
84. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S. Ct. at 1212.
85. For an extended discussion of the best interests of the child, see infra text
accompanying notes 108-120.
86. See La. R.S. 46:236.1(F) (1982).
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personal relationship with his child, and thus to assume a responsible
role in the future of his child." '87 However, the majority asserted that
the natural father's interests could not be recognized to the exclusion
of the interest of the mother and husband. "Rather, both of these
competing liberty interests are entitled to recognition, since both may
coexist compatibly as in the more commonly encountered situation of
visitation by noncustodial parents following divorce and remarriage." 88
The child's best interest was addressed, not in regard to the paternity
action, but as the central factor to be considered in determining visitation
rights.
The second circuit resolved the dilemma of two fathers raising claims
to one child admirably; the court bypassed easy answers in the form
of legal presumptions in favor of giving careful consideration to com-
plicated interests. Dual paternity results because both men are accorded
the status of father to the child. Nevertheless, the court inaccurately
analogized the new situation to post-divorce visitation by the noncustodial
parent when the custodial parent has remarried. The custodial parent's
new spouse has no parental rights of his own, while both men in a
dual paternity context are vested with paternal status.
In dual paternity situations resulting from the child's assertion of
inheritance or wrongful death claims, the problem of defining each
father's role is not pressing since one of the fathers has died. When
dual paternity results from an assertion of personal interests, however,
the court's decision impacts heavily on both fathers. While the court
in Finnerty did not delineate which rights and obligations will be accorded
to each father, the opinion asserts that their interests can be served
simultaneously.8 9 Indeed, the fair and practical resolution of the problem
calls for a sharing of parental rights.
IV. SHARING PARENTAL RIGHTS
The exclusive status of parenthood is premised on the notion "that
parents raise their own children in nuclear families."' 9 The nuclear
family, however, has lost its prominence in society, due to the multitude
of divorces, remarriages, and other living arrangements that are now
commonplace. Twenty-five per cent of United States children under the
age of eighteen did not live with both natural parents in 1982,91 and
this figure is estimated to grow to forty percent by 1990.
87. 469 So. 2d at 292.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Bartlett, supra note 2, at 879.
91. Fifty-eight per cent of all black children in the United States did not live with
both parents. Id. at 880, 881.
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As a result of these changes in living patterns, children often form
attachments to adults other than their legal parents. These psychological
bonds, such as those between stepparents and stepchildren and between
unwed fathers and their children, are afforded little, if any, legal pro-
tection, since the exclusive rights to the child are vested in the legal
parents. Yet a child's need for continuity and security in his personal
relationships may point to the need to legally protect these relationships.
The relationship between a child and his stepparent is a type of
extra legal parent-child relationship which has compelled a form of ju-
dicial recognition. In Gribble v. Gribble,9 2 a stepfather sought visitation
rights with his ex-wife's son as part of a divorce settlement. He claimed
that he had treated the boy as his own son, had lived with him since
he was two months old, and felt very close to him. In addition, he
offered to pay fifty dollars a month into a trust fund for the child.
Although the pertinent statute which allowed for the granting of visitation
rights to "parents, grandparents and other relatives" 93 did not include
stepparents, the Utah Supreme Court construed the statute to include
stepparents who had assumed the status of in loco parentis. If the
stepfather was found to have assumed this status, said the court, his
rights to the child would be that of a legal parent. The stepfather had
a due process right to a hearing to determine whether or not he stood
in loco parentis to his stepchild. If the relationship was found to exist,
he had a right to another hearing to determine his right to visitation
and whether that right should be conditioned on a requirement of child
support.
A similar case came before the Alaska Supreme Court in Carter v.
Broderick." Again, a stepfather sought the right to visit his ex-wife's
child after a divorce. The court applied the doctrine of in loco parentis
to extend a statute authorizing visitation to include the stepfather, ob-
serving that "those relationships that affect the child which are based
upon psychological rather than biological parentage may be important
enough to protect through custody and visitation, to ensure that the
child's best interests are being served." 9
The handling of the stepfathers' interests in these two cases provides
a clear example of non-exclusive parenthood, a framework which "per-
mits recognition of de facto parenting relationships without severing the
child's relationships with natural or legal parents." 96 Under this ap-
proach, the legal parents no longer hold exclusive rights to the child;
92. 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).
93. Id. at 66.
94. 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982).
95. Id. at 855.
%. Bartlett, 'supra note 2, at 944.
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rather, the de facto and legal parents share at least the visitation
rights.
In the context of visitation, the heart of a personal relationship
between a child and a noncustodial parent,9 7 such a sharing of rights
could provide the most equitable result amid a sea of competing interests.
Nevertheless, three principles, extracted from the stepparent cases, are
probably essential to the workability and fairness of such a solution.
First, an actual relationship should exist between the adult and the
child-a de facto parent-child relationship. Second, the adult must show
a willingness to accept some responsibility for the child, possibly a child
support obligation. According to the court in Gribble, "Loco parentis
does not envision that a stepparent be permitted to enjoy the rights of
a natural parent without also accepting the responsibilities that are
incurred." 98 Finally, awarding visitation rights must be in the best in-
terests of the child.
These guidelines echo the distinction between an actual and a bi-
ological relationship used by some courts in determining the substantive
rights of an unwed natural father. As in these stepparent cases, the just
resolution of disputes in which an unwed father wishes to establish his
paternity for the purpose of obtaining visitation rights may often result
in dual paternity anda sharing of parental rights. The husband remains
the legal father, but the natural father is allowed to establish his pa-
ternity. As the biological father, he may be able to assert a right to
visit his child. Whether or not the court awards him this right, however,
should depend on various considerations over and above the biological
connection which accorded him the right to establish his paternity.
Guided by the stepparent cases, the court should consider the father's
relationship with the child, his willingness to assume responsibility, and
the effect upon the child of such an award.
V. VISITATION RIGHTS
A. The Nature of Visitation Rights
The term " '[p]arental rights' . . . [is generally) used to refer spe-
cifically to a bundle of obligations and rights that are recognized in a
legally cognizable parent-child relationship."" These rights may, how-
ever, be divided into two categories: (1) the formal legal aspects of the
parent-child relationship, such as the right to recover for the wrongful
death of the other, or the right to inherit from each other's estates;
and (2) the associational aspects, the sharing of love, companionship,
97. See infra text accompanying notes 102-105,
98. 583 P.2d at 68.
99. Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot, I Univ. Ill. L.
Rev. 121, 121 n.2 (1983).
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and heritage.'" It is the "[associational] elements [which] imbue the
parent-child relationship with its special character and, accordingly, el-
evate it to its especially protected legal position."' 0
In Stanley, the United States Supreme Court stated that, "the interest
of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting
economic arrangements.""110 2 Because visitation provides the only means
by which a noncustodial parent may maintain his relationship with the
child, the right of visitation represents the very essence of parental
rights. 103 In fact, in Louisiana, visitation is viewed as a form of custody °4
and as "a natural right [of a noncustodial parent] with respect to his
children." "
Moreover, visitation is important to the child in that "[dienial of
visitation can cause a child to feel rejected and confused,"' j if the
child has enjoyed contact with the parent beforehand. Visitation provides
the avenue for maintaining personal ties with a noncustodial parent;
thus the purpose of visitation is to benefit and protect the child as well
as the parent. 07
B. Visitation and the Best Interests of the Child
A child's interests are greatly protected by the courts, due to the
assumption that children are "incomplete beings who are not fully
competent to determine and safeguard their interests."'0 8 Therefore, in
determining visitation rights, "[tihe rights of any parent are always
subservient to the best interests of the child."'19
Though the goal is worthy, a determination of "best interests" is
complex. In past years, family life was generally more intact. As a
result, "the parents' interest in raising the child and the child's interest
in remaining with his parents normally coincide[d], and the law ...
[did] not then enter the private realm of the family.""10 Today, increased
100. Id. at 131.
101. Id.
102. 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S. Ct. at 1212, citing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95, 69 S. Ct. 448, 458 (1949).
103. Novinson, supra note 99, at 131.
104. Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375, 377 (La. 1983).
105. Id. at 376.
106. Note, Visitation Beyond the Traditional Limitations, 60 Ind. L. J. 191, 194 (1984).
107. Id.
108. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, and A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
3 (1973).
109. Maxwell, 434 So. 2d 377.
110. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals
for Legislative Change, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 10, 29 (1975).
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family instability has resulted in contrasting interests. "Often what [either
parent] . . .wants has little relationship to the child's needs or expressed
desires, particularly in bitterly contested divorces."", The court is often
faced with the difficult task of focusing on the child's needs amid
competing parental concerns and contradictory advice from various child
experts.
To begin with, the biological connection between the unwed father
and child carries little significance in determining the child's interests
in visitation. Although important for medical reasons and a valid reason
for allowing the father an opportunity to establish paternity, biology is
not significant in visitation:
Children have no psychological conception of relationship by
blood-tie until quite late in their development .... What reg-
isters in their minds are the day-to-day interchanges with the
adults who take care of them and who, on the strength of these,
become the parent figures to whom they are attached."
2
Thus, a court would look to the child's existing personal relationships
to determine whether it is in the child's best interests to continue or
discontinue them.
Two areas of concern in this determination are the child's need for
continuity and the problem of confused loyalties when noncustodial
parents are allowed to maintain contact with the child. A child needs
continuity, but what type of continuity? Some child psychologists assert
that visits with noncustodial parents for the purpose of maintaining a
relationship may be a source of discontinuity. The argument is that
"children have difficulty in relating positively to, profiting from, and
maintaining the contact with two ... parents who are not in positive
contact with each other.""' 3
Similarly, granting the father visitation rights may result in con-
flicting loyalties for the child," 4 or the child may not have the ability
to cope with multiple relationships. Some experts recommend that, even
in divorce situations, the custodial parent be given the right to decide
when and if the noncustodial parent should be allowed to visit the
child.'
In contrast is the more plausible assertion that if a father has
established a relationship with the child, a denial of this access to the
child may unsettle and confuse the child. Moreover, "recent research
Ill. Wallerstein and Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: Helping Children and Parents Cope
With Divorce 132, 133 (1980).
112. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, supra note 108 at 12, 13.





does not bear out the conclusion that severing relations with parents
S.. will resolve a child's loyalty conflicts. In fact, loss of contact with
absent parents is more likely to aggravate those problems."
' 16
In interviews with children of divorced parents, the "children ex-
pressed the wish for increased contact with their fathers with a startling
and moving intensity,"" 7 which "persisted undiminished over many years,
long after the divorce was accepted as an unalterable fact of life.""' 8
Even when the visitation exacerbated hostilities between their parents,
"most of the youngsters managed to shake off the bad or anxious
beginnings and enjoy the actual visit itself."" 9
Protecting the child's best interests calls for flexibility in considering
the child's situation, in light of today's changing composition of family
groupings:
American society is no longer composed of neat nuclear units
of biological families. If children can adjust to stepfathers,
adoptive fathers, live-in fathers, intermittent fathers, and absent
fathers, they can adjust to having two fathers, both of whom
want them-a biological one with visitation rights and a 'psy-
chological' one with whom they live.' °
C. Visitation Guidelines and Restrictions
Any guidelines developed for determining when to give an unwed
father visitation rights must be viewed against a backdrop of established
guidelines for deciding visitation disputes generally. In addition, it is
important to realize that visitation can take many forms. Thus, even if
the court accords visitation rights to a noncustodial parent, the visits
may be restricted in many ways and for many reasons.
Two fundamental rules in visitation cases in Louisiana are explained
in Edelen v. Edelen:121
(1) the paramount consideration in determining visitation rights
is the best interest of the child; and (2) the trial court has great
discretion in the area and his determination will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of manifest error. Furthermore, each
individual case is dependent upon its own facts. 1
22
116. Bartlett, supra note 2, at 909.
117. Wallerstein and Kelly, supra note I1, at 134.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 142.
120. Note, Bastardizing the Legitimate Child: The Colorado Supreme Court Invalidates
the Uniform Parentage Act Presumption of Legitimacy in R. McG. v. J. W., 59 Den.
L. J. 157, 172 (1981).
121. 457 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 175.
19861 1233
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
It is also important that when one parent is seeking visitation rights,
"[ilt is the burden of the parent seeking to deny access or visitation
... to prove that the visitation would not be in the best interest of
the child." 2 ' In Finnerty, the court correctly imposed this burden after
the natural father established paternity. 24
Beyond these requirements, courts deciding visitation cases involving
divorced parents have looked to other factors, many of which would
be equally applicable in determining the unwed father's rights to vis-
itation. Maxwell v. LeBlanc125 lists several factors to be used for guidance
in visitation cases, including "the love, affection, and other emotional
ties existing between the parties and the child, . . . the relationship of
the child's mother and father, . . . [and] the effect of visitation upon
[the] physical condition of [the] child."' 2 6 Nevertheless, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Maxwell cautioned against a mechanical application
of these factors. Instead, it is presumed that continued contact with the
noncustodial parent is usually in the child's best interests. 21 Moreover,
''a parent is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless it is proved
conclusively that visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health."'' 28
The court provided examples of situations in which unwed parents
may be denied visitation, despite the presumption that visitation will be
in the child's best interests. Such situations include those in which "the
duration, nature, and extent of the relationship between the mother and
father was not sufficient to warrant recognition of the father's status
as a parent,"' 2 9 such as when the mother has given birth as a result
of a rape, or when the father refused to marry the mother and en-
couraged her to have an abortion. 30 Unwed parents have also been
denied visitation rights when they have shown no interest in the child
or when the court has felt that visitation would have harmful effects
upon the child.' 3'
Even when granted, visitation may take many forms. The parent
may be granted "reasonable visitation," to be worked out between the
visiting parent and the custodial parent, or very restricted visitation,
with times and places specified by the court. Restrictions may take the
form of requiring the presence of the custodial parent or limiting the
123. Maxwell v. Leblanc, 434 So. 2d at 378.
124. 469 So. 2d at 297.
125. 434 So. 2d 375.
126. Id. at 378.
127. Id. at 379.
128. Id.
129. Id.




visits to a few hours.'3 2 In Edelen, the second circuit let stand a restriction
on a noncustodial father's visitation rights which limited the visits to
three hours per week because the husband's conduct indicated that he
"may be emotionally incapable of properly caring for the child.'' 33 The
trial judge observed that the father "has a consistent need to control
his feelings of anger and has trouble with interpersonal relationships."' 3
4
In summary, an unwed father's assertion of visitation rights with
his child must be analyzed against a backdrop of existing principles.
The trial court has much discretion in making the determination, and
the most important factor is whether visitation will be in the best interests
of the child. On the side of the noncustodial parent seeking the visitation
rights is a presumption that visitation is in the child's best interests,
unless the custodial parent establishes that the visits would be detrimental
to the child. In Maxwell, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that
visitation rights "belong to all parents regardless of illegitimacy of
parenthood," 33 and in Finnerty, the second circuit extended the pre-
sumption that visitation will be in the child's best interests to an unwed
father seeking visitation with his child, even though the child had a
presumed father. 3 6
The principles extracted from the due process analysis within this
comment may be superimposed on these visitation guidelines. The actual
relationship which the father has with his child is what affords him
substantive rights as a parent. If he has only a biological relationship,
he should be allowed to make out a factual basis to establish his
paternity, but chances are slim that he will be granted visitation rights
without an actual relationship with the child. Even with the existence
of an actual relationship with the child, the father could still be denied
visitation if the court determines that the visits would harm the child.
If there is an ongoing relationship, however, continuing visitation will
likely be in the child's best interests, since discontinuing the visits will
terminate the relationship. If, in addition to an actual relationship, the
father displays a willingness to assume some responsibility for the child's
well-being, the child's interests are protected even more by allowing
visitation.
To limit intrusion into the family unit, the court can restrict the
father's visits. Such limitations on the visits may effectively work as a
compromise between the rights and interests of the biological father and
those of the legal father and mother.
132. Note, Visitation, supra note 106, at 194.
133. 457 So. 2d at 176.
134. Id.
135. 434 So. 2d at 377.




The dilemma of "the child with two fathers" compels a confron-
tation between very divergent interests. These interests include a mother
who wants to maintain her family unit, a husband who has voluntarily
accepted paternal responsibilities when he could have disavowed the
child, and a biological father who desires a relationship with his own
child. The judge's focus in this context inevitably narrows to the child
and how the controversy will affect him.
Based on the analyses within this comment, two proposals are offered
for dealing with such disputes: the first is a modification of concepts;
the second is a modification of law.
(1) The fairest, most workable resolution of the controversy entails
the sharing of parental rights as opposed to the granting of exclusive
rights to either father. The husband should not be displaced from his
role in any degree; instead, his parental rights and obligations may be
shared, to a practicable extent, with the biological father who is equally
concerned for the child's welfare.
This may be accomplished in two steps. First, the natural father
must be allowed to establish factually that he is the child's father. This
step affords him the opportunity, at least, to establish a relationship
with his child, and thus protects his due process rights as a parent.
Having established his parenthood, the father may then approach the
court for more substantive rights-in particular, the right to visit his
child.
At present in Louisiana, there is no clear statutory authority for
the assertion of an unwed father's rights when the child is already the
legitimate child of the mother's husband. The creative but questionable
methods employed by the courts to achieve just results in these disputes
must be replaced with clear authority. Therefore:
(2)(a) The ability of the unwed natural father to establish his pa-
ternity should be protected by clear statutory authority. This may be
accomplished through legislative action in either of two ways: through
a rewording of the existing articles, or through the addition of a new
article governing actions by unwed fathers to establish their paternity
of children already classified as legitimate. Until this is accomplished,
the Louisiana Supreme Court should do for the father at least what it
has done for the child in Griffin. The court must issue a clear, decisive
interpretation of the existing articles on legitimation and acknowledg-
ment.
(b) The unwed natural father's assertion of visitation rights, after
he has successfully established his paternity, should be analyzed according
to uniform principles and guidelines. Such an analysis should begin with
the presumption that awarding visitation rights to the father is in the
best interests of the child, a presumption accorded all natural parents.
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Since the mother may rebut this presumption, the focal point of the
dispute becomes a determination of what is most beneficial to the child.
Significant in this determination should be the existence or nonex-
istence of an actual parent-child relationship between the father and
child. If such a relationship exists, awarding visitation rights is as im-
portant to the child as to the father, since visitation provides the only
means for maintaining the tie between them. The presence of an actual
relationship also strengthens the father's claim to visitation rights since
it demonstrates his serious intent in assuming the role of father to the
child. An additional finding that he is willing to assume parental ob-
ligations should also support a finding that continued contact with the
father through visitation is in the best interests of the child. If visitation
rights are granted, the judge may structure the award in such a way
as to minimize the damage to any parent's interests and to maximize
the welfare of the child.
In retrospect, the wisdom of Solomon remains valid today, even
though the consequences to the competing parents are different. The
same concern exemplified by his judgment in the case of the child with
two mothers is equally evident in the modern concept of shared parental
rights. It is "wisdom which is concerned with the actual business of
living rather than with abstractions."' 37
Valerie Seal Meiners
137. 3 The Interpreter's Bible 44, 45 (1954).
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